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REFORMING MONETARY SANCTIONS, 
REDUCING POLICE VIOLENCE
Sharon Brett
Abstract
In the years since Officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael 
Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, policymakers and advocates have pushed 
for reforms to both police practices and systems of fines and fees.  The 
connection between fines and fees enforcement tactics and police vio-
lence remains an important focus for reforms.  Police play a significant 
role in driving up the volume and amounts of fines and fees imposed, 
and they play a critical role in city and state collection efforts.  The use 
of police as debt imposers and collectors creates opportunities for police 
violence—both physical use of force, as well as more nuanced forms of 
violence through the exertion of coercion, fear, and control.  In this piece, 
I argue that specific policing tactics used to impose and collect fines and 
fees, and the wide latitude given to police via Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence to engage in such tactics, facilitates conditions similar to those 
in Ferguson and results in unnecessary and oppressive police violence. 
To combat this, I argue that fines and fees reforms must focus on the role 
of law enforcement in such systems, and how that role must be greatly 
limited to prevent additional violence.
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Introduction
In 2014, Officer Darren Wilson of the Ferguson, Missouri Police De-
partment (FPD) ended a routine law enforcement encounter by shooting 
and killing Michael Brown, an unarmed African American resident.  The 
murder of Michael Brown set off weeks of local and national protests, and 
ultimately led to a federal investigation into the Department’s pattern and 
practice of unlawful conduct.1  The Department of Justice’s Civil Rights 
Division (DOJ) concluded not only that FPD officers frequently used 
excessive force, but also that the Department structured its entire polic-
ing strategy in pursuit of the goal of revenue generation.  FPD fulfilled 
its revenue-generation goals by heavily policing predominately Black and 
low-income communities for low-level offenses; issuing large amounts 
of traffic tickets and citations for violations of misdemeanor ordinances; 
and enforcing those tickets and citations to collect high fines and court 
fees (monetary sanctions).2  As explained in detail in the Department of 
Justice’s investigative report, fines and fees enforcement and predatory 
policing were two parts of the same system, institutionalized without re-
gard for the life-altering (and in some cases, life-ending) consequences.3 
Advocates and local attorneys had been investigating and reporting on 
these issues prior to Michael Brown’s murder,4 but the DOJ investigation 
in Ferguson served as a national wakeup call to the symbiotic connection 
between the destructive wealth extraction carried out by municipal courts 
and the racist—and often violent—oppression carried out by police.
1. Manuel Roig-Franzia et al., In Ferguson, three minutes—and two lives forever 
changed, Wash. Post (Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
in-ferguson-three-minutes-and-two-lives-forever-changed/2014/08/16/f28f5bc0-
2588-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation 
of the Ferguson Police Department (Mar. 4, 2015) [hereinafter DOJ Fergu-
son Report].
2. See generally DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 1.
3. Id. at 1–6.
4. See, e.g., Arch City Defenders, Municipal Courts White Paper (2014).
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In the wake of the events in Ferguson, advocacy and academic 
scholarship digesting the events has taken two tracks: one focused on 
continued police violence against Black and brown bodies, and another 
focused on the practices of courts in imposing high fines and fees, and 
the court-sanctioned punitive enforcement practices aimed at collecting 
outstanding debts.5  National attention remains on both instances of po-
lice violence6 and on revenue-generating misdemeanor offenses.7  But 
fewer projects have directly tackled the role of fines and fees in perpet-
uating police violence, or the need to reduce police power in order to 
disrupt and dismantle predatory systems of fines and fees.  This Article 
returns the conversation on fines and fees reform to its genesis—the ac-
tions of police—and discusses how unbridled police discretion to pursue 
low-level crimes and collect monetary sanctions creates opportunities for 
violence of varying types and degrees.
Police officers are the “gatekeepers of the criminal justice system,” 
and thereby “hold almost exclusive authority—by way of citations, ar-
rests, and even physical force—to enforce and regulate the law.”8  They 
have the discretion to arrest a person, or give them a citation in lieu of 
arrest,  or even  just let them off with a warning; they have the authority 
to effectuate arrests, and decide when to use force to do so (and how 
much); and they have the authority to target particular neighborhoods 
for enforcement activities like traffic enforcement or quality-of-life 
crimes.  Each of these points of discretion give the police the opportunity 
to police more, and to police violently.
5. See generally Sharon Brett & Mitali Nagrecha, Harvard Law Sch. Crim. Jus-
tice Policy Program, Proportionate Financial Sanctions: Policy Prescrip-
tions for Judicial Reform (2019); Myesha Braden et al., Lawyers’ Comm. 
for Civil Rights Under Law, Too Poor to Pay: How Arkansas’ Offender- 
Funded Justice System Drives Poverty & Mass Incarceration (2019); Nat’l 
Task Force on Fines, Fees, & Bail Practices, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, 
Principles on Fines, Fees, and Bail Practices (2018); Alicia Bannon, Re-
bekah Diller, & Mitali Nagrecha, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Criminal Jus-
tice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry (2010).
6. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez et al., Fort Worth Police Have More Violence to 
Answer for, Residents Say, N.Y. Times (Oct. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/10/20/us/fort-worth-shooting-jefferson-dean.html [https://perma.cc/
AP8W-H8A7]; Shani Saxon, California Passes One of Nation’s Strictest Dead-
ly Force Guidelines, Colorlines (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.colorlines.com/
articles/california-passes-one-nations-strictest-deadly-force-guidelines [https:// 
perma.cc/F5HK-TWJH]; P.R. Lockhart, Police Officer Resigns After Video 
Shows Him Using Excessive Force on 11-Year-Old Girl, Vox (Oct. 24, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/10/24/20929397/police-officer-excessive-
force-school-11-year-old-girl-new-mexico [https://perma.cc/KG8T-RYVR].
7. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Punishment Without Crime 113–147 (2018); 
Preeti Chauhan & Jeremy Travis, Introduction to Special Issue: Misdemeanor 
Justice Project—A Focus on Criminal Justice System Responses to Lower Level 
Offenses, 29 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 527 (2018).
8. Rebecca Neusteter et al., Vera Inst. of Justice, Gatekeepers: The Role of 
Police in Ending Mass Incarceration 2 (2019).
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Many of these points of discretion also give police the tremendous 
power to extract wealth through arresting on charges or issuing citations 
that result in financial sanctions like fines and fees.  Police can exercise 
their discretion in a way that gives them a tangible benefit through in-
creased revenue and/or increased “productivity.”9  Not only do police have 
the authority to drive up fines and fees through these types of discretionary 
decisions, they also have virtually unchecked discretion to collect on those 
fines and fees in violent and dangerous ways, such as warrant raids10 and 
predatory traffic stops to check for outstanding warrants.  Although the 
Fourth Amendment provides some outer boundaries on police discretion, 
legal doctrines such as qualified immunity and municipal liability, and the 
relatively forgiving standards set by the Supreme Court, mean that the tac-
tical discretion afforded to police is both wide and forgiving.
Attempts to collect large amounts of fines and fees through traffic 
tickets or municipal ordinance violations and overpolicing of low-level 
offenses are examples of police violence in and of themselves.  Such strat-
egies by their very nature include state surveillance and the exertion of 
power and control.  They result in police officers detaining individuals 
for unspecified periods of time to run warrant checks; in officers stopping 
and searching cars, asking intrusive and coercive questions;11 and in other 
forms of oppression that are inherently violent and predatory, even if no 
physical violence is used.12
Overpolicing of minor offenses makes these individual instances 
of violence routine.  They allow for more and more contact between the 
police and community members—contact that is experienced as violent. 
This, in turn, creates “circuits of violence through which the ordinary 
(African Americans’ vulnerability to ongoing police surveillance and 
contact) becomes the extraordinary (serious bodily injury and death).”13 
Devastatingly, many of these “routine” examples of police violence lev-
ied on Black and brown bodies turn deadly.  A South Carolina police 
officer shot and killed Walter Scott after he was pulled over for unpaid 
traffic tickets.14  A New York Police Department officer killed Eric Gar-
ner by using a chokehold, a procedure banned by NYPD policy, to arrest 
9. See infra Part I.
10. Warrant raids are described more thoroughly in Subpart III.B.
11. Jeannine Bell, The Violence of Nosey Questions, Presentation at Beyond Bad Ap-
ples: Exploring the Legal Determinants of Police Violence, The Annual B.U. Law 
Rev. Conference, (Oct. 25, 2019); (discussing the “nosey questions” police ask 
during traffic stops and how those are a form of police violence); see also Jean-
nine Bell, The Violence of Nosey Questions, 100 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020).
12. For more on how these “routine” interactions are forms of police violence, see 
infra Part II.
13. Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The 
Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 125, 128 
(2017) [hereinafter Carbado, From Stopping Black People].
14. Alan Blinder, Michael Slager, Officer in Walter Scott Shooting, Gets 20-Year Sen-
tence, N.Y. Times (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/ michael-
slager-sentence-walter-scott.html [https://perma.cc/JW7T-ZM7W].
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him for selling loose cigarettes—a misdemeanor “quality of life” crime.15 
Philandro Castile was caught up in an endless cycle of traffic violations 
and unpaid court debt, until during one such traffic stop a St. Anthony, 
Minnesota police officer shot and killed him.16
It is important to note that aggressive policing is so common in 
Black and brown communities and police have demonized Black bod-
ies in such a way that police have shot and killed unarmed Black and 
brown people for no reason at all—like Bettie Jones, shot and killed by 
a Chicago police officer who responded to Jones’ neighbor’s apartment 
for a “wellness check;”17 or Botham Jean, killed by a white officer in Dal-
las who mistakenly thought Jean’s apartment was her own;18 or Atatiana 
Jefferson, who was at home in Ft. Worth playing video games with her 
nephew when a police officer responding to a nonemergency call from 
a neighbor shot her through her window.19  In 2019, U.S. police shot and 
killed 1004 people;20 in each of the last five years, that number has consis-
tently been close to or above 1000.21  Notably, these numbers track only 
people who are killed by police guns; many more die each year as the 
result of other police actions (or inaction), for example, through vehicle 
chases or in police lock-ups.22  One database tracking instances of police 
violence reports that in 2018, there were only twenty-three days in which 
a police officer did not kill someone.23  All of these killings are tragic and 
avoidable,24 and many were the direct result of the outsized role that law 
15. Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. 
Times (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric- 
garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html [https://perma.cc/5M4J-CUUX].
16. Teresa Nelson, Two Years After the Police Killing of Philando Castile, Justice 
Continues to be Denied, ACLU(July 6, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial- 
justice/two-years-after-police-killing-philando-castile-justice-continues-be-de-
nied [https://perma.cc/9RTM-3G62].
17.  Dan Hinkel, Chicago Police Watchdog Rules 2015 Shooting of Quintonio 
LeGrieer and Bettie Jones was Unjustified, Chi. Trib. (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-legrier-jones-shooting- unjustified-
20171228-story.html [https://perma.cc/C3ZU-R6BK].
18. Michael James, Ex-Dallas Police Officer Indicted for Murder After Shoot-
ing Black Neighbor, USA Today (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/2018/11/30/dallas-cop-officer-racial-murder-indictment- 
guyger/2165572002 [https://perma.cc/LTC9-FBM7].
19. What We Know About the Fort Worth Police Shooting of Atatiana Jefferson, 
N.Y. Times (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/15/us/aaron-dean- 
atatiana-jefferson.html [https://perma.cc/2P9L-HDWM].
20. Fatal Force: 2019 Police Shootings Database, Wash. Post, https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-2019 [https:// perma.
cc/C4TR-24QX] (last visited April 1, 2020).
21. Id.
22. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, When Police Kill (2017) (explaining how 
difficult it is to track the true number of police killings each year).
23. Samuel Sinyangwe, Mapping Police Violence (Apr. 3, 2020) https:// 
mappingpoliceviolence.org.
24. One scholar, Michael Arjun Banerjee, suggests that these killings amount to 
state executions without trial or any due process that should be analyzed under 
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enforcement plays in the lives of those who live in Black, predominate-
ly poor, communities25 where the police are enforcing low-level offenses 
and collecting fines and fees.
In this Article, I argue that when police are tasked with the mission 
of imposing large amounts of fines and fees, and use punitive, oppressive 
enforcement tactics, police violence along the way is not only unsurpris-
ing—it is essentially inevitable.26  By violence, I do not necessarily mean 
Eighth Amendment law.  This framework is especially helpful in showing the 
true excessiveness of this type of policing and its impact on the lives and safety 
of entire communities, especially in the context of enforcing low-level offenses in 
the name of driving up fines and fees.  See Ipse Dixit: Michael Arjun Banerjee on 
No-Trial Execution, (Oct. 11, 2019) https://shows.acast.com/ ipse-dixit/ episodes/
michael-arjun-banerjee-on-no-trial-execution; Michael Banerjee, Police vio-
lence against civilians 30 years after Graham v. Connor, Charlotte Post (May 15, 
2019, 1:10 PM), http://www.thecharlottepost.com/news/2019/05/15/opinion/po-
lice-violence-against-civilians-30-years-after-graham-v.-connor.
25. Police are relied on to manage or control a variety of social problems other 
than criminal activity, including mental illness, poverty, democratic protest, qual-
ity-of-life issues, and substance use.  Neusteter et al., supra note 8, at 2.  More 
often than not, they do not have the skills or tools necessary to handle these sit-
uations; they are trained to remove the threat, incapacitate, and control—not 
to perform wellness checks or provide crisis counseling services.  Doug Criss 
& Leah Asmelash, When a Police Wellness Check Becomes a Death Sentence, 
CNN (Oct. 19, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/19/us/wellness-check-police-
shootings-trnd/index.html; Aldina Mesic et al., The Relationship Between Struc-
tural Racism and Black-White Disparities in Fatal Police Shootings at the State 
Level, 110 J. Nat’l Med. Ass’n 106 (2018).  Indeed, control is the crux of both his-
torical and modern policing: Professor Alex S. Vitale has said that “[w]e should 
understand policing as the most coercive form of state power . . . and the reason 
is that policing has historically and inherently been at the root of reproducing 
fundamental inequalities of race, class, and immigration status.”  Rashmee Ku-
mar, Envisioning an America Free from Police Violence and Control, The Inter-
cept (Oct. 15, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/10/15/alex-vitale- interview-
the-end-of-policing.
26. In part, this Article builds on the work of UCLA Law Professor Devon W. Car-
bado, who previously wrote that “the disproportionate exposure African-Amer-
icans have to police violence derives in part from their disproportionate contact 
with the police.”  He describes how general trends in criminal-legal enforce-
ment, including (among others) broken windows policing and mass criminaliza-
tion, coupled with racial segregation and group vulnerability, generate signifi-
cant police contact with Black communities.  Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black 
Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 Geo. L.J. 1479 (2016) 
[hereinafter Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence].  Carbado touches on the role 
fines and fees plays in increasing these contacts by addressing what he calls 
“predatory policing,” which he defines as “the direct targeting of vulnerable 
groups by way of arrests or the issuance of citations as sources of revenue for the 
city or the police department, or to effectuate promotions and pay increases for 
particular officers.  Id. at 1502; see also Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 
UMKC L. Rev. 548 (2017) [hereinafter Carbado, Predatory Policing].  Predato-
ry policing, argues Professor Carbado, “potentially facilitates police violence by 
increasing the frequency with which African-Americans have contact with the 
police.”  Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence, at 1504 (2016).  As he points out, and 
I expand upon in this Article, the possibility of violence exists both during the 
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officer-involved shootings and deaths like the examples I list above—al-
though those certainly do happen.  Police violence can take many forms. 
Unjustified stops and searches (which amount to seizures of the body),27 
uses of force that do not result in bodily injury,28 and even unrelenting 
police surveillance in Black communities can all be seen and experienced 
as types of police violence.29  And the systematic oppression of Black, 
brown, and poor communities through a vicious cycle of enforcement, 
arrest, and the levying of criminal justice debt is a form of violence in and 
of itself.30  Police brutality creates farreaching public health and econom-
ic consequences for entire communities.31  In short, this type of policing 
violently enforces racial and socioeconomic hierarchies, and in turn ex-
cuses a longrunning governmental failure to invest in the social supports 
necessary to keep communities healthy and thriving: , another form of 
broader State violence.
Given this context, advocacy for fines and fees reforms should ad-
dress the role of police in perpetuating systems of monetary sanctions. 
Likewise, activists pursuing justice for those shot and killed by the police 
are key allies in the fight to dismantle current systems of fines and fees, 
given the violence police inflict enforcing those systems.  Reforms cannot 
simply target budget structures or court policies, because as I discuss in 
Part I, revenue generation alone does not explain police misconduct or 
the wide latitude police have to inflict violence on minority communities 
in the name of imposing or collecting fines and fees.32  Many of the re-
issuance of traffic tickets to drive up revenue, and when police enforce warrants 
for previously unpaid debts.
27. Susan Bandes et al., The Mismeasure of Terry Stops: Assessing the Psychologi-
cal and Emotional Harms of Stop and Frisk to Individuals and Communities, 37 
Beh. Sci. & L. 176 (2019).
28. Justin M. Feldman et al., Temporal Trends and Racial/Ethnic Inequalities for Le-
gal Intervention Injuries Treated in Emergency Departments: U.S. Men and Wom-
en Age 15–34 (2001–2014), 93 J. Urban Health 797 (2016) (53,000 people treat-
ed a year in hospitals for police-inflicted injuries).
29. Even if physical violence does not occur, “involuntary police citizen contacts” 
for low-level offenses or fine enforcement are “rarely gentle or neutral . . . they 
[are] neither pleasant nor without emotional consequences.” Jeffrey Fagan & 
Elliott Ash, New Policing, New Segregation: From Ferguson to New York, 106 
Geo. L.J. Online 33, 40 (2017).  Later in this Article, I advocate for a more ex-
pansive definition of police violence that recognizes the myriad harms police- 
community enforcement interactions can create.
30. Theresa Zhen described this by writing that “the citations are the batons, the 
fines the weapons of financial destruction, and the fees the instruments of depri-
vation.”  Theresa Zhen, (Color)Blind Reform: How Ability-to-Pay Determina-
tions Are Inadequate to Transform a Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. 
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 177, 179 (2019).
31. See Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Police Violence, Use of Force Pol-
icies, and Public Health, 43 Am. J.L. & Med. 279, 283–84 (2017).
32. Carbado discusses “five specific dynamics that compound the general exposure 
to police violence repeated police interactions create,” including stereotypes of 
African Americans as violent or dangerous; increased likelihood of arrest, which 
increases likelihood of use of force; increased incarceration rates; vulnerabilities 
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forms to municipal court practices aimed at curbing excessive fines and 
fees fail to account for the ways in which racialized, excessive policing fa-
cilitates and perpetuates those systems.33  Instead, fines and fees reforms 
must also work to reduce the scope and involvement of law enforcement 
in fines and fees collection, and to significantly curtail their authority to 
pursue individuals who are behind on payments in order to reduce po-
lice-community contacts that could result in police violence.
In Part I, I explain the role that police play in creating a pipeline 
of high amounts of fines and fees, both through broken windows-based 
policing and revenue generation-motivated policing.  In Part II, I con-
template what constitutes police violence, particularly in the context of 
fines and fees enforcement.  In Part III, I explore specific policing tactics 
related to fines and fees collection, including the affirmative execution of 
warrants and the use of pretextual stops/searches and vehicle checkpoints 
for warrant enforcement.  In Part IV, I argue that law enforcement’s role 
in both feeding the fines and fees pipeline and pursuing aggressive col-
lection techniques creates opportunities for police violence.  Finally, I 
conclude by suggesting that fines and fees reform should not lose sight 
of the role police play in imposing and collecting monetary sanctions, 
and the need to reduce police involvement in those systems in order to 
reduce the risk of police violence.
I. Role of the Police in Driving Up Fines and Fees
Fines and fees imposition and enforcement is a particularly 
pernicious method of police exertion of social control over certain com-
munities;34 one which is ripe for abuse of discretion.  When cities rely on 
police officers to issue revenue-generating tickets and enforce warrants 
for failure to pay court fines and fees on these tickets, officers shift polic-
ing priorities accordingly.  They become tax collectors,35 omnipresent in 
communities where there may be the most opportunity to issue tickets 
with fines, or enforce outstanding warrants.36  At the same time, warrants 
and court orders to pay fines and fees give police cover or pretext to po-
lice heavily in certain communities.
and police insecurities created by repeated exposure; and resistance.  Carbado, 
Blue-on-Black Violence, supra note 26, at 1509–11.
33. See Theresa Zhen, supra note 30, at 180.
34. See, e.g., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Targeted Fines and Fees Against Com-
munities of Color: Civil Rights and Constitutional Implications 19–30 
(2017).
35. Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’ 
Prisons, 75 Md. L. Rev. 486, 523 (2016); Bannon et al., supra note 5, at 6–10.
36. At least 4.9 million people are jailed each year, and more than one in four of 
those people are jailed multiple times—nearly half of those people had indi-
vidual incomes below $10,000 per year.  See Alexi Jones & Wendy Sawyer., 
Prison Policy Initiative, Arrest, Release, Repeat: How Police and Jails are 
Misused to Respond to Social Problems (2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/repeatarrests.html.
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Police are responsible for generating high amounts of fines and fees 
in at least two ways.  First, according to broken windows policing, police 
should target low-level quality-of-life crimes in the interest of preventing 
the conditions of social disorder that could allow more serious criminal 
activity to flourish.37  Broken windows policing explicitly targets individ-
uals for the enforcement of ordinance violations or low-level crimes or 
in the name of preventing more serious ones.  The result is that police 
issue citations or arrests on misdemeanors which come with significant 
fines and fees.38  Most often, broken-windows oriented policing strategies 
are deliberately deployed in low-income and Black and brown commu-
nities.39  This type of policing allows police to interject themselves into 
many different situations and all facets of everyday life—thereby driving 
up the frequency of police-community contact, the issuance of more tick-
ets, and the opportunity for police violence.
The second driver of fines and fees enforcement is the criminal-le-
gal system’s direct fiscal interest in collecting fines and fees.  Hundreds 
of jurisdictions across the country use fines and fees to fund a significant 
portion of their local budget.40  In at least 284 local governments, fines 
account for more than twenty percent of the general fund.41  According 
to one study, over 720 localities reported that fines and fees generated 
annual revenues that exceeded $100 for every adult resident.42
Neither of these drivers of the fines and fees pipeline can truly be 
justified as beneficial to public safety—in fact, both broken windows 
policing and revenue generation policing can negatively impact law en-
forcement’s ability to fight more serious crimes and improve public safety 
outcomes.  Overpolicing of low-level crimes, even without an explicit 
37. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken 
Windows Policing (2004).
38. These arrests and citations also have several downstream personal and econom-
ic consequences because they create a criminal record that can be difficult to ex-
punge, and that can impact job opportunities, access to education and benefits, 
and more.  See generally Natapoff, supra note 7, at 28–32.
39. See, e.g. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Civil Rights Div., Investigation Of The Newark 
Police Department 21 (2014) (describing how Newark Police Department of-
ficers would focus on issuing citations in public housing projects because they 
were “convenient targets” for citations for quality of life issues.); Jeffrey Fagan 
& Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in 
New York City, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 457 (2000); U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, 
The Civil Rights Implications of “Broken Windows” Policing in NYC and 
General NYPD Accountability to the Public 11 (2018), https://www.usccr.
gov/pubs/2018/03-22-NYSAC.pdf; Sarah Childress, The Problem with “Broken 
Windows” Policing, PBS: Frontline (June 28, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
frontline/article/the-problem-with-broken-windows-policing.
40. Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines, Governing: The Future of States and Locali-
ties (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-addicted-to-
fines.html.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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revenue generation goal, is not an effective deterrent.43  Researchers have 
concluded that pursuing this strategy in an attempt to reduce the level of 
social or physical disorder in a neighborhood is actually not an effective or 
optimal use of policing resources from the standpoint of preventing more 
serious crimes.44  Additionally, overreliance on low-level crimes or enforce-
ment strategies that generate revenue affects police departments’ ability to 
engage in other law enforcement activities.  A recent study found that po-
lice departments in cities that collect a greater share of revenue from fees 
solve property and violent crimes at a lower rate than those departments 
that do not collect a high share of revenue from fees.45  Instead of making 
communities safer, broken windows policing and revenue generation po-
licing consume large amounts of police resources, generating heavy fines 
for minor offenses and disproportionately targeting the poor.46
When cities rely on heavy fines and fees to sustain and fund govern-
ment functions, police “see the people they’re supposed to be serving not 
as citizens with rights, but as potential sources of revenue, as lawbreakers 
to be caught.”47  Although the full scope of law enforcement’s power to 
extract money from community members, including through civil asset 
forfeiture,48 is beyond the scope of this Article, targeted policing of low 
level crimes for the purposes of revenue generation ensures that police 
are active participants in the criminal-legal system’s extraction of money 
from poor, predominately Black communities.
To be clear, police managers, including Chiefs, deputy chiefs, and 
other high-level decisionmakers, are choosing to enforce low-level crimes 
and traffic ordinances for a reason.  Police enjoy a tremendous amount of 
43. See generally Harcourt, supra note 37; Bernard Harcourt, Reflecting on the Sub-
ject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Win-
dows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 
291, 308–09 (1998) (explaining the deterrence theory of broken windows polic-
ing and how evidence does not support that theory).
44. See Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from 
New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 271 (2006) 
(analyzing studies and concluding that evidence does not support the concept 
behind broken windows policing, and that order-maintenance policing or mea-
sures designed to reduce the level of social and physical disorder in a communi-
ty do not adequately serve their purported public safety goals).
45. Rebecca Goldstein et al., Exploitative Revenues, Law Enforcement, and the 
Quality of Government Service, 56 Urb. Aff. Rev. 5 (2020).
46. Rose Hackman, Bratton-Style Policing Means More Fines and Arrests for 
Black Residents of Detroit, Guardian (Sept. 7, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://www. 
theguardian.com/money/2014/sep/07/safer-detroit-fines-racial- profiling-black-
resident [https://perma.cc/B9KJ-9M45].
47. Radley Balko, Why We Need to Fix St. Louis County, Wash. Post (Oct. 16 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/10/16/why-we-need-
to-fix-st-louis [https://perma.cc/VBR3-72GN].
48. See Carbado, Predatory Policing, supra note 26, at 556–558, for a sound discus-
sion of the way civil asset forfeiture connects to the issues discussed in this Arti-
cle.
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discretion to police how they see fit, due in part to the power they hold49 
and the generous protections afforded to them by Fourth Amendment 
law and the doctrine of qualified immunity.50  Police can decide where 
and how to police.  They can target particular neighborhoods for aggres-
sive traffic enforcement; they can prioritize arrests for certain low-level 
crimes.  Law enforcement priorities are typically set by the Chief of Po-
lice or her command staff.51  But the Chief is appointed by the executive 
branch—and may therefore be accountable to local politicians and sub-
ject to the budgeting decisions of the mayor and local legislators.  Political 
pressures directly impact police strategy and behavior.52
Police also have an obligation to enforce the law, including by exe-
cuting outstanding warrants issued by the courts for failure to appear or 
pay fines and fees.  When directives come from the executive or judicial 
branches to enforce fines and fees, as they did in Ferguson,53 law enforce-
ment and other government actors fall in line.54  In the case of Ferguson, 
emails from the city’s Finance Director instructed law enforcement to 
“fill the revenue pipeline” by issuing more tickets, and city officials en-
forced the use of aggressive collection efforts, praising those efforts that 
resulted in increased collections.55
The more successful a police department is at bringing in revenue 
for a city through fines and fees, the more funding that department will 
likely receive in the next budgetary cycle.  With more money in the city’s 
budget, there will be more to distribute, and the police will be seen as 
having done their job well, and therefore in need of more resources to 
bring in even more revenue in the next fiscal cycle.  Data suggest that 
most police departments derive direct revenue benefits from fines and 
fees enforcement, either through earmarked fees specifically designat-
ed to the department or through budgeting allocation from the general 
fund.56  Those funds can be used to increase the department’s revenue 
49. Neusteter et al., supra note 8, at 2 (“Police officers, as gatekeepers of the crim-
inal justice system, hold almost exclusive authority—by way of citations, arrests, 
and even physical force—to enforce and regulate the law.”).
50. Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 Harv. 
L. Rev. F. 268, 276 (2015).
51. See Neusteter et al., supra note 8, at 23–25.
52. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Community Relations Services Toolkit for Policing: 
Policing 101, at 6; see generally Neusteter et al., supra note 8, at 23–25.
53. DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 1, at 10.
54. See Beth A. Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson on Individual Defense Representa-
tion as a Tool of Systemic Reform, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1171, 1187–90 (2017).
55. DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 1, at 12–14.
56. Rebecca Goldstein, Michael W. Sances, & Hye Young You, Exploitative Reve-
nues, Law Enforcement, and the Quality of Government Service, 56 Urb. Aff. 
Rev. 5 (2018); Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government? 
Descriptive Representation and Exploitative Revenue Sources, 79 J. of Pol. 1090, 
1090 (2017) (according to Census of Governments data from 2012, 80 percent of 
American cities obtain at least some revenue from fees, fines, and asset forfei-
tures, and about 6 percent of cities collect more than 10 percent of their revenue 
through these revenue streams).
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extraction reach through hiring additional officers or the acquisition of 
new policing technologies.
But even where police do not gain a direct fiscal benefit from en-
forcing fines and fees, they can still drive up the amount of fines and fees 
imposed when they use their discretion to set their own enforcement pri-
orities.  Police may be motivated to issue large numbers of citations or 
aggressively target certain neighborhoods even without a revenue interest, 
due to tough-on-crime policies, a general desire to exert social control and 
minimize disorder,57 or even unchecked racism.  Or police chiefs may (for-
mally or informally) require arrest or ticket quotas from their officers to 
demonstrate productivity, and these metrics are often used in evaluating 
officers for promotions or more plum beat or shift assignments.58  This has a 
self-sustaining effect: chiefs may use these stats to justify requests for addi-
tional resources, which can then fund efforts to hire more officers who can 
continue deploying these tactics.  Individual officers may also be motivated 
to arrest more people on low level charges because doing so allows them 
to work more hours processing and booking those arrests, which results in 
overtime pay.59  And even if police do not directly benefit from each ticket 
issued in terms of a percentage of the fine distributed to the department’s 
budget, “high-performing” departments and units may receive ancillary 
benefits, such as higher performance-based budgeting awards.  Policing in 
this way still drives up the amount of fines and fees owed, even if there is 
no direct conflict of interest like there was in Ferguson.
Often, broken windows policing and for-profit policing operate in 
tandem.  The Ferguson report made this scheme clear.  There, the city’s 
police force targeted Black residents for low-level “quality of life” offens-
es, such as not adequately maintaining their lawn or “manner of walking 
in roadway.”60  These ordinances were on the books—and enforced—al-
legedly for public safety reasons.  These offenses came with heavy fines 
and mandatory court fees, which were imposed against people without any 
regard for their ability to pay;61 when individuals failed to pay or appear, 
many because of their poverty, warrants were issued for their arrest.62  These 
57. Gerstein & Prescott, supra note 50 (discussing how quality-of-life policing is en-
tirely within the discretion of the police).
58. Neusteter et al., supra note 8, at 23–25; see also Saki Knafo, How Aggressive Po-
licing Affects Police Officers Themselves, Atlantic (July 13, 2015), https://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/aggressive-policing-quotas/398165 
[https://perma.cc/J575-7UCJ]; Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Race and the Tragedy of 
Quota-Based Policing, Am. Prospect (Nov. 3, 2016), https://prospect.org/justice/
race-tragedy-quota-based-policing [https://perma.cc/28FW-Y2C7].
59. Alan Feuer & Joseph Goldstein, The Arrest Was a Bust.  The Officers Got Overtime 
Anyway, N.Y. Times (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/ 
nyregion/new-york-police-overtime-pay-trial.html [https://perma.cc/J4CW-
QRQ4]; Neusteter et al., supra note 8, at 27.
60. DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 1, at 4, 52.
61. Id. at 52–53.
62. Id. at 55.
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warrants carried additional charges (and fines and fees),63 compounding 
people’s outstanding debt.  Community members reported hiding from the 
outside world, foregoing participating in public life, essentially afraid to go 
outdoors due to unpaid court debt and outstanding warrants.64
These dual tracks feeding the fines and fees pipeline require man-
agers to make policing decisions that force officers to police in a way that 
generates the biggest return on investment, and bring in as much revenue 
as they can.  Directing resources to police low-level and traffic offenses 
in Black, brown, and poor communities for the purpose of issuing tickets 
or enforcing outstanding warrants for unpaid court debt will, as Profes-
sor Devon Carbado asserts, “open[] the door to more intrusive, potentially 
violence-producing . . . encounters with the police.”65  The issuing of a cita-
tion to drive up revenue is the “primary” market for police interaction and 
therefore violence, but a “secondary” market is created when individuals 
are unable to pay their fines and are subjected to outstanding warrants and 
the collection tactics described above; each of these “are police contact 
events that can culminate in arrest, incarceration, and violence.”66
II. An Expansive View of Police Violence
As alluded to in the Introduction, police violence can take many 
forms and is inherently more complex than mere use of force or physi-
cal control.  Professor Micol Seigel reminds us that “violence exists in a 
great continuum from the most immediate thunk of an impact to the most 
attenuated inflictions of discursive, epistemic, symbolic, psychic, and eco-
nomic injury[.]”67  Violence can be episodic and immediate, and it can also 
be structural and institutional.  Although this Article points to examples 
of extraordinary police violence, including police-involved deaths, it is im-
portant to remember that fines and fees enforcement results in violence 
in many different forms.68  When thinking about how to reform systems of 
fines and fees, and eliminate cycles of punishment and brutality in general, 
we must use this expansive framework to consider what constitutes police 
violence, and the ways in which police exert social control and power over 
certain communities every day in inherently violent ways, even when these 
interactions do not result in bodily injury or death.69
63. Id. at 59–61.
64. Id. at 79.
65. Carbado, From Stopping Black People, supra note 13, at 130.
66. Carbado, Predatory Policing, supra note 26, at 561–62.
67. Micol Seigel, Violence Work 11 (2018).
68. Naomi Murakawa, Weaponized Empathy, in Charles Ogletree, Jr. and Austin 
Sarat, Racial Reconcilation and the Healing of a Nation: Beyond Law and 
Rights 104 (N.Y.U. Press 2017) (“With our eyes locked on the bloodletting of 
‘extreme’ police force, we might miss the death by a thousand cuts through par-
adigmatic policing, namely the policing of misdemeanors.”).
69. See Ekow N. Yankah, Pretext and Justification: Republicanism, Policing, and 
Race, 40 Cardozo L. Rev. 1543, 1569–70 (2019) (“persistent contact with po-
lice officers consistently produces humiliating exchanges in which the po-
lice—embodying state power—casually insult, use racial epithets, and roughly 
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Arrests and Terry stops are a form of police violence, even when no 
true “force” is used or pain inflicted.70  Terry searches, as recognized by the 
Supreme Court, are “as serious intrusion upon the sanctity of a person, 
which may inflict a great indignity and arouse strong resentment.”71  Stop 
and frisks “cause injury more like police brutality than racial microag-
gression” and the methods used to search “are frequently experienced as 
sexual touchings.”72  Stop and frisk is therefore a form of police violence.
Arrests are clearly seizures of the body, and even investigatory 
Terry stops involve a short-term seizure.73  Punitive enforcement of fines 
and fees through these seizures, either in the levying of the fine or the 
response to nonpayment, have costs.  Each is a denial of liberty and a 
curtailment of freedom, however temporary.74  Both can be frightening 
and humiliating.  Arrests create records that may impact employment 
prospects and come with additional costs, such as booking fees.  This, 
of course, is to say nothing of the violence that a person might endure 
during transport following the arrest,75 or once he is booked into jail on 
the outstanding warrant.76
manhandle . . . [and] one cannot ignore the volatile tinder these interactions cre-
ate, resulting in the most spectacular and tragic explosions.”).
70. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (a person is “seized” with-
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when a reasonable person would not 
feel free to disregard the officer and leave).  The decision to arrest also increases 
the opportunity for traditional violence in the form of the officer’s use of force. 
See Rachel Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 315–16 (2016) (describ-
ing officer-involved deaths, including the death of Eric Garner, which began as 
routine encounters but turned deadly after the officer decided to arrest, and 
used force to effectuate that arrest).
71. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968).
72. Paul Butler, Chokehold: Policing Black Men 97 (The New Press, 2017).
73. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–20 (1968) (an investigatory stop amounts to a sei-
zure “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom 
to walk away.”); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“a person 
has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view 
of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave”).
74. Harmon, supra  note 70, at 313.
75. Freddie Gray was arrested in Baltimore because he ran from an officer and once 
apprehended, the officer allegedly found a switchblade in Mr. Gray’s pants.  State 
prosecutors and the police commissioner questioned the legality of the arrest. 
Once arrested, Mr. Gray was handcuffed, placed in the back of a police van for 
transport to the police station for booking.  Officers denied Mr. Gray medical 
treatment despite several requests. Officers also failed to restrain Mr. Gray with 
by a seat belt in the transport van, even though his arms and legs were shackled, 
making it difficult for him to brace himself for any impact during the ride.  Po-
lice documents indicate that Mr. Gray suffered a “medical emergency” during the 
transport.  Mr. Gray arrived at the hospital for treatment in critical condition, with 
his spine “80% severed at the neck.”  He died shortly thereafter.  Freddie Gray’s 
Death in Police Custody—What We Know, BBC News (May 23, 2016), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32400497 [https://perma.cc/FUW8-PCSL].
76. Individuals may experience additional law enforcement violence when they are 
incarcerated, in the form of harassment, degrading living conditions, excessive 
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More abstractly, police enforcement of fines and fees is violent in 
that it works to further oppress Black, brown, and poor communities, re-
inforce racial and socioeconomic divisions, and entangle more people in 
the criminal-legal system.  This in and of itself is a form of police violence 
against those communities.  Punitive enforcement of fines and fees cre-
ates an “arrest feedback” loop, wherein people originally cited for minor 
offenses end up arrested and often incarcerated on outstanding warrants, 
even for small periods of time, even though they couldn’t have been sub-
jected to incarceration for the underlying offense.  Even short stays in jail 
can have devastating consequences, personally,77 professionally,78 and for 
peoples’ families.
The constant fear of arrest and incarceration due to unpaid fines 
and fees is also violence.  Again, the work of Micol Seigel is illuminating: 
“the violence of police is often latent or withheld, but it is functional 
precisely because it is suspended.  It often need not be made manifest, 
because people fear it and grant it legitimacy[.]”79  When individuals 
owe outstanding fines and fees and know that they can be arrested for 
force, denial of medical or mental health care, or—in the most extreme, but un-
fortunately not uncommon cases—death in custody.  For example, Sandra Bland 
was arrested following a traffic stop for failure to signal during a lane change, and 
died in police custody three days later.  Adeel Hassan, The Sandra Bland Video: 
What We Know, N.Y. Times (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/
us/sandra-bland-brian-encinia.html [https://perma.cc/8S8W-7GF7].  In Meridi-
an, Mississippi, Robert Wayne Johnson was incarcerated for failure to pay court 
debt.  He was supposed to spend only two days in jail, even though he lacked 
the ability to pay his fines.  Fifty-four days later, he remained incarcerated—
and committed suicide.  Kim Bellware, How One Man’s Jail Suicide Underscores 
Mississippi’s Mental Health Crisis, Wash. Post (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/10/16/sentenced-days-held-how-one-mans-
jail-suicide-underscores-mississippis-mental-health-care-crisis [https://perma.
cc/4EBN-9TYF].
77. Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial De-
tention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 713 (2017) (people detained pretrial, even for only 
a few days, can lose their job, housing, or custody of their children); Shane Shif-
flett et al., Since Sandra (Database), July 16, 2016, http://data.huffingtonpost.
com/2016/jail-deaths [https://perma.cc/RCK5-J5H2] (documenting 815 people 
who died in jail in one year, many of whom died within just three days of incar-
ceration).
78. Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, The Pew Charitable Trusts, Collater-
al Costs: Incarceration’s effect on Economic Mobility (2010), https://
www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/collater-
al costs1pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/F 8D2-NPA6] (finding that being in jail re-
duces future wages by 11 percent, cuts average future annual employment by 
nine weeks, and cuts future yearly earnings by 40 percent); see also Alexan-
der M. Holsinger, Crime and Justice Inst., Analyzing Bond Supervision Sur-
vey Data: The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Self-Reported Outcomes 
(2016), http://www.crj.org/assets/2017/07/13_bond_supervision _report _R3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7ZGF-WXMH] (finding that spending less than 3 days in jail 
caused job loss in 4.7 percent of cases and spending more than three days in jail 
caused job loss in 14 percent of cases).
79. Seigel, supra note 67.
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nonpayment at any time, they become even more fearful of police and the 
State at large—a form of “violence suspended” that can be as life-alter-
ing as physical violence itself.  People may stop driving because they fear 
being pulled over and arrested for outstanding traffic tickets; and because 
they no longer drive, they are no longer able to work.  This latent violence 
essentially traps people and prevents them from getting out of debt.
A final form of police violence through targeted enforcement of 
fines and fees is the havoc such policing wreaks in already economically 
disadvantaged communities.  Fines and fees enforcement further com-
pounds poverty and depresses economic mobility in those communities.80 
It also builds upon generations of laws, policies, and systems designed 
to exclude Black and brown individuals from full public participation. 
Policing has historically been a system of social control and alienation of 
marginalized communities, with roots in the subjugation of Black people 
through slavery continued through the policing of Black bodies in the 
Jim Crowe era and into the modern day.81  Heavy fines and fees, inabil-
ity to pay, and the constant threat of arrest, incarceration, or additional 
punishment, is a manifestation of this continued social control: it pre-
vents individuals from escaping the cycle of poverty and criminal justice 
involvement in which they are trapped.82  This in turn may generate addi-
tional criminogenic behavior in an attempt to pay off fines and fees,83 the 
80. See Alexes Harris, A Pound of Flesh: Monetary Sanctions as a Permanent 
Punishment for Poor People (2016); Fagan & Ash, supra note 29; Ella Bak-
er Center for Human Rights et al., Who Pays?  The True Cost of Incar-
ceration on Families (Sept. 2015), https://ellabakercenter.org/sites/default/files/
downloads/who-pays.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PUJ-J978].
81. See generally Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: 
Race Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America (2011); Sally Had-
den, Slave Patrols: Law and Violence in Virginia and the Carolinas (2001); 
Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Mak-
ing of Mass Incarceration in America (2017).
82. See Murakawa, supra note 68 (“Fees and fines for misdemeanor offenses are 
seemingly small burdens that tend to compound over time, sometimes bring-
ing inescapable debt and heightened surveillance that makes new arrests all the 
more likely.”).
83. A prime example of this are state policies that allow for automatic suspension 
of drivers’ licenses for unpaid court debt, and subsequent prosecutions of indi-
viduals for driving on a suspended license.  Many of those individuals live in sys-
tems without reliable public transit, and rely on their licenses to drive to their 
jobs, which they must do to earn enough money to pay off their court debt and 
regain their drivers’ licenses.  See generally Brett & Nagrecha, supra note 5. 
But individuals may turn to criminal behavior to pay off fines and fees in oth-
er ways as well.  For example, research done by the Alabama Appleseed Cen-
ter for Law and Justice found that 38 percent of survey respondents who owed 
outstanding court debt reported committing crimes to pay off their court debts, 
including selling drugs or their bodies.  See Ala. Appleseed Cntr. for Law & 
Justice, Under Pressure: How Fines and Fees Hurt People, Undermine Pub-
lic Safety, and Drive Alabama’s Racial Wealth Divide (2019), https://www. 
alabamaappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/aa1240-finesandfees-10-10-
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZJT-ZWGZ].
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policing of which creates additional opportunities for police interaction 
and violence.84
As discussed in the next Part, the tactics police use to serve these 
goals can be violent in and of themselves, but police also rely on saturation 
of particular communities—most often Black, brown, or poor—thereby 
driving up police contacts in those neighborhoods where relationships 
with law enforcement are already fraught, many of which inevitably end 
in police violence.
III. Fines and Fees Enforcement Tactics
Once the “fines and fees pipeline” is fed through enforcement 
decisions that target low-level offenses or support revenue-generation 
goals, there is still a question of how police carry out those policing pri-
orities.  Police officers make a variety of choices when carrying out their 
law enforcement obligations, both in general and specifically with regard 
to collecting fines and fees.  The strategies they choose, including where 
to target enforcement efforts (geographic decisions), the personnel to 
use (deployment and staffing decisions), and the specific tactics for en-
forcement (e.g., stop and frisk, the use of specialized units for warrant 
enforcement, sweeps, or vehicle checkpoints), are all possible touch-
points for unnecessarily punitive contact between law enforcement and 
members of the community.  Some of these tactics are inherently violent. 
But even when encounters begin as “routine” (and in some communities, 
“routine” means openly hostile or antagonistic), they can quickly become 
physically aggressive or even dangerous, especially when they deployed 
with regular frequency in Black, brown, and poor communities.
In this Part, I address how current law allows the police wide lati-
tude to enforce low-level high-fine crimes and outstanding warrants for 
failure to pay fines and fees.  I then discuss how a few common tactical 
choices,85 including proactive warrant enforcement, traffic stops, and ve-
hicle checkpoints, are used to impose or enforce fines and fees, and how 
these can create negative interactions, which can escalate into violent—if 
not deadly—encounters.
84. See Alexes Harris, Heather Evans, & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from 
Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 15 
Am. J. Soc. 1753, 1761 (2010) (“ .  .  .  if the imposition of monetary sanctions is 
also considered, the impact of penal expansion on the stratification system may 
be far greater than these studies suggest, and the mechanisms by which poverty 
and inequality are reproduced are even more numerous.”).
85. Other tactical choices and policing techniques undoubtedly contribute to this 
dynamic as well.  For example, field interviews and other types of “consensual” 
contacts with community members could yield information necessary to search 
for outstanding warrants for failure to pay fines and fees.  Such procedures, with-
out reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initially stop and detain, consti-
tute an illegal seizure; but these practices are commonly deployed regardless.
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A. Constitutionally Permissible Fines and Fees Enforcement
Our current expansive criminal code, combined with relatively 
deferential Fourth Amendment doctrine, allows for police to engage in 
widespread enforcement of fines and fees using tactics that unquestion-
ably harmful, yet perfectly constitutional.
There are an astoundingly large number of low-level offenses on the 
books in each city and state, resulting in roughly 13 million misdemeanor 
cases being filed in the United States in 2015 alone.86  This may not even 
include all traffic offenses, which in some places are not misdemeanors 
but instead labeled as civil infractions.87  Each of these offenses come 
with fines and fees.88  Of course, it is “perfectly legal to impose fines and 
fees for misdemeanors and minor violations, even on people who can-
not afford to pay them.”89  The Constitution does not protect against the 
overpolicing of low-level offenses and the imposition of large amounts of 
fines.  Police are constitutionally permitted to stop, search, cite, or arrest 
people for a whole host of commonplace, relatively innocuous behaviors 
like speeding or jaywalking or littering, simply because those behaviors 
are, in many jurisdictions, criminalized.
Moreover, Fourth Amendment doctrine makes police violence in 
the name of fines and fees enforcement possible; perhaps even encour-
aging it.90  Officers have wide latitude under the Fourth Amendment to 
enforce warrants, including through proactive warrant efforts such as 
sweeps and raids,91 and through vehicle stops.92  When a warrant has been 
issued for an individual’s arrest, whether for serious conduct such as suspi-
cion of involvement in a murder or minor conduct such as failure to make 
a timely payment towards fines and fees, police are permitted to act.  This 
includes affirmatively executing the warrant under the plain language of 
the Fourth Amendment, and arresting someone through the course of an 
investigatory encounter once they discover the outstanding warrant ex-
ists.  Fourth Amendment doctrine allows police to enforce those warrants 
in a variety of ways, constitutional or otherwise, without much protection 
for individuals owing court debt.  This is because the presence of a war-
rant cures all sorts of police misconduct; where a warrant exists, it doesn’t 
much matter whether the officer’s conduct that precipitated the discov-
ery of the warrant was constitutional.  The Fourth Amendment’s typical 
exclusionary remedy suddenly becomes out of reach.93
Police are constitutionally permitted to stop any individual or vehi-
cle provided there is “reasonable suspicion” that a crime has or is about to 
86. See Natapoff, supra note 7, at 41.
87. Id. at 44–45.
88. Id. at 115 et. seq.
89. Id. at 137.
90. See generally Carbado, From Stopping Black People, supra note 13.
91. See Subpart III.B.
92. See Subpart III.C.
93. See Nirej Sekhon, Dangerous Warrants, 93 Wash. L. Rev. 967, 983, 994 (2018).
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occur.94  Whren v. United States taught us that the police have the author-
ity to stop a car whenever any traffic violation has occurred, even if the 
real reason the police were interested in that vehicle in the first place was 
because of a hunch that its occupants were involved in another crime.95 
Given the litany of vehicle infractions that would provide enough reason-
able suspicion or even probable cause for a stop,96 this is not a difficult 
hurdle to surmount.97  Police may—and indeed do—direct their traffic 
patrol efforts in communities with a large number of outstanding war-
rants, under the guise of important traffic safety enforcement but with 
the intended additional effect of enforcing outstanding warrants.98  Al-
though police would not be allowed to stop each car passing by to check 
for outstanding warrants without some reasonable suspicion of either 
criminal activity or that an outstanding warrant exists,99 they could stop 
any car engaged in a minor driving infraction—even something as small 
as driving three miles over the speed limit.  The ability to stop for such 
minor infractions means that traffic enforcement is an appealing tactic 
for police departments to search for outstanding warrants and arrest for 
prior failures to pay.
Current Fourth Amendment law also makes it perfectly legal for 
police to bootstrap a search of a person from an illegal stop so long as 
there is an outstanding warrant, even if that warrant is only for failure 
to pay fines and fees on a traffic ticket.  This can further entrench indi-
viduals in the criminal legal system.  In Utah v. Strieff, an officer made 
an unconstitutional stop of a vehicle, but during the course of the stop, 
94. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000).
95. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).  Professor Paul Butler argues that 
this is one of law enforcement’s “superpowers:” the ability, granted by Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, to stop motorists without a truly valid reason for doing 
so.  Butler, supra note 72.
96. For example, in Fort Worth, Texas, the following (among many, many others) are 
all traffic violations that would provide justification for a traffic stop: changing 
lanes without signal; turn at private driveway without signal; turn from parked 
without signal; unsafe backing; fail to yield right of way to pedestrian—private 
drive; into private drive—no signal; fail to yield right of way from alley; fail to 
yield right of way—yield sign; no turn signal—stop vehicle; U-turn on crest/hill; 
fail to yield right of way at green light; license plates—switched; unclean license 
plate; and unlawful riding.  Fort Worth Municipal Court Fine Schedule, City 
of Fort Worth, Texas (Jan. 1, 2020), http://fortworthtexas.gov/files/b71e28bf-
f231-445f-a984-892a6d83b7f7.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q723-3GZH].
97. See David A. Harris, Driving While Black and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Su-
preme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 544, 545 
(1997) (arguing that the “comprehensive scope of state traffic codes makes them 
extremely powerful tools under Whren”).
98. See generally Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Rou-
tine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 672, 748–49 (2015) (discussing how noncrim-
inal traffic enforcement can be used as a tool for criminal enforcement of other 
laws under a public safety justification that may be misapplied).
99. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that the state’s interest in 
conducting checks for outstanding warrants of motorists does not outweigh the 
intrusion on privacy for individuals who are detained).
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discovered that there was an outstanding warrant for the driver’s arrest.100 
The officer then conducted a search incident to arrest on the outstanding 
warrant, during which the officer found narcotics—and charged the indi-
vidual with a new offense for drug possession.101  The Court held that the 
exclusionary rule did not apply and would therefore not bar admission 
of the narcotics discovered in the search incident to arrest, because al-
though the original stop was unconstitutional, the search was incident to 
a valid arrest warrant.102  The exclusionary rule did not apply because the 
connection between the unconstitutional conduct (the stop) and the dis-
covery of the evidence incident to arrest was sufficiently attenuated, due 
to the valid outstanding warrant.103  Streiff could therefore be convicted 
of a new crime, despite the initial unconstitutional stop.
Under that case, police officers are free to target motorists (or in-
dividuals more generally) for stops in order to check for outstanding 
warrants.  They might even get lucky and during the stop and search 
incident to arrest on the warrant find evidence sufficient to charge the 
motorist with a new crime, potentially collecting more fines or fees.  Al-
though the majority in Streiff left open the possibility of a remedy if a 
defendant could show that a police department was engaging in a pattern 
or practice of unconstitutional stops for the purposes of finding outstand-
ing arrest warrants, scholars have pointed out that it is unlikely that an 
individual defendant would be able to make such a showing.104  Proving 
a pattern or practice of police misconduct is inordinately difficult,105 even 
more so in the context of traffic stops, where officers have wide discretion 
to effectuate stops and searches and subsequently enforce outstand-
ing warrants.
B. Affirmative Enforcement of Warrants for Outstanding Fines 
and Fees
When a person is sentenced to pay fines and fees, and fails to pay in 
full or misses an installment payment, courts across the country will issue 
a bench warrant allowing police to arrest that person and bring them 
100. Utah v. Strieff,136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
101. Id. at 2060.
102. Id. at 2063.
103. Id. at 2063–64.
104. See, e.g., Sekhon, supra note 93.
105. See generally Rachel A. Harmon, Legal Remedies for Police Misconduct, in 2 Re-
forming Criminal Justice: Policing 27 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), https://law.asu.
edu/sites/default/files/pdf/academy_for_justice/2_Reforming-Criminal-Justice_
Vol_2_Legal-Remedies-for-Police-Misconduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW4K-
J3EX]; Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Civil Rights Division’s 
Pattern and Practice Police Reform Work: 1994–Present (2017), https://www.
justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download [https://perma.cc/KQ4T-PP2F].
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before the court to explain their failure to pay.106  Many people will not 
even know that a warrant is out for their arrest.107
Warrants are an extreme reaction to missed payments; they sudden-
ly subject an individual to arrest and incarceration, and all the attendant 
consequences.108  Yet, even following reforms in several jurisdictions, 
including Missouri, warrants are still an enforcement option to compel 
payment, even if less punitive intermediate steps must be taken first.109 
The police serve as the arm of the court to find, arrest, and bring the per-
son before the court to answer for the “offense” of noncompliance with 
the prior court order.
Some departments or jurisdictions do not actively enforce these 
warrants, but rather track them in electronic systems and use them to 
arrest individuals who come into police contact by other means, for ex-
ample, through traffic stops.  In this way, “outstanding warrants create 
opportunities for police leniency and severity, both at the institutional 
and individual levels.”110
106. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-810 (2020) (“[If] a defendant who is sentenced to 
pay a fine, a surcharge, a fee, an assessment or incarceration costs defaults in the 
payment of the fine, surcharge, fee, assessment or incarceration costs or of any 
installment as ordered, the court, on motion of the prosecuting attorney or on its 
own motion, shall require the defendant to show cause why the defendant’s de-
fault should not be treated as contempt and may issue a summons or a warrant 
of arrest for the defendant’s appearance.”); Miss. Code. Ann. § 99-37-7 (2020) 
(“Subject to the provisions of section 99-19-20.1, when a defendant sentenced to 
pay a fine or to make restitution defaults in the payment thereof or of any in-
stallment, the court, on motion of the district attorney, or upon its own motion, 
may require him to show cause why his default should not be treated as con-
tempt of court, and may issue a show cause citation or a warrant of arrest for his 
appearance.”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-12-3 (2019) (“When a defendant sentenced 
to pay a fine in installments or ordered to pay fees or costs defaults in payment, 
the court, upon motion of the prosecutor or upon its own motion, may require 
the defendant to show cause why his default should not be treated as contu-
macious and may issue a summons or a warrant of arrest for his appearance.”); 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2947.14 (LexisNexis 2020) (“If the court or magistrate 
has found the offender able to pay a fine at a hearing conducted in compliance 
with divisions (A) and (B) of this section, and the offender fails to pay the fine, a 
warrant may be issued for the arrest of the offender.”); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
6-317 (LexisNexis 2020) (allowing the court to issue an arrest warrant to compel 
the person to appear at the show cause hearing if it appears to the court that the 
individual is not likely to appear).
107. See, e.g., DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 1, at 47 (describing how DOJ inves-
tigators spoke with several individuals in Ferguson who were arrested without 
ever knowing that there was a warrant out for their arrest).
108. Brett & Nagrecha, supra note 5, at 36–37; Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal 
Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., & Lisa Foster, 
Director, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office for Access to Justice, to Colleague 6 (Mar. 
14, 2016), https://www.courts.wa.gov/subsite/mjc/docs/DOJDearColleague.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RSY2-6JTD].
109. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 37.65 (requiring that the court first attempt to use show cause or-
ders rather than arrest warrants to secure appearance upon nonpayment).
110. Sekhon, supra note 93.
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Yet, departments can—and many do—affirmatively and openly en-
force noncompliance warrants through specific policing tactics.  One such 
tactic is the use of “warrant sweeps,”111 where police saturate a specific 
geographic location (such as a housing complex or neighborhood) to at-
tempt to serve and enforce as many outstanding warrants as possible.  In 
Detroit, the police chief led a raid in 2013 of a public housing complex as 
part of a largescale operation entitled “Operation Clean Sweep,” which 
law enforcement claimed was necessary to reduce violence.112  Swat team 
officers “bust[ed] in doors with firearms drawn and arrested large num-
bers of people with outstanding warrants.  Thirty people were arrested 
that day, twenty-one of which were taken into custody for unpaid traf-
fic tickets.113
These types of raids are not necessarily just for enforcement of un-
paid fines and fees—raids are often justified as necessary to “clean up” 
outstanding warrants (some of which may be for felony conduct), “keep 
the criminal justice system moving smoothly[,]” and “maintain[] respect 
for the authority of the judicial system.”114  But because of the large num-
ber of warrants issued solely for failure to pay fines and fees or failure 
to appear (FTA), individuals who owe monetary sanctions—but perhaps 
only for low level offenses—might get swept up in the raids all the same.115 
And given the catalogue of abuses and mistakes that can occur during 
such raids,116 using this tactic to clear outstanding warrants—including 
warrants for failure to pay—creates additional opportunities for police 
111. See, e.g., Barbara Miller, Warrant ‘Sweep’ Rounds up 56 Who Owed Court 
Fines in York County, PennLive.com (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.pennlive.com/
news/2016/08/warrant_sweep_rounds_up_56_who.html [https://perma.cc/4VB5-
72L4]; see also City News Service, Police Arrest 36 People in East County War-
rant Sweep, Fox5 KSWB-TV (June 15, 2019), https://fox5sandiego.com/2019/06/15/
police-arrest-36-people-in-east-county-warrant-sweep [https://perma.cc/EQH6-
J69L]; Kim Crawford, Court Announces Amnesty Program for Warrants, Tickets, 
MLive.com (June 28, 2006), https://www.mlive.com/flintjournal/newsnow/2006/06/
court_announces_amnesty_progra.html [https://perma.cc/N4RS-KLDQ]; Amy 
Greene, Del City Clearing Warrants Offenders Paying Fines to Avoid Arrest, Okla-
homan (Mar. 8, 1999), https://oklahoman.com/ article/2645354/del-city-clearing-
warrants-offenders-paying-fines-to-avoid-arrest [https://perma.cc/EWK8-LZS9].
112. Ryan Felton, Operation: Restore Public Relations, Det. Metro Times (Apr. 15, 
2015), https://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/operation-restore-public-relations/
Content?oid=2334953&showFullText=true [https://perma.cc/7WQ2-E7CG].
113. Id.
114. Jon Kelvey, Police Arrest More than 20 During Warrant Sweep, Baltimore Sun 
(Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/carroll/news/crime/ph-
cc-warrant-sweep-092815-20150928-story.html [https://perma.cc/9HHE- ZAWN].
115. E.g., Thomas J. Prohaska, Niagara County Police Agencies Rack up 112 Arrests 
in Warrant Sweep (Sept. 19, 2019), https://buffalonews.com/2019/09/19/niagara-
county-police-agencies-rack-up-112-arrests-in-warrant-sweep [https://perma.cc/
FR3Q-76J2] (describing a warrant sweep that resulted in arrests on warrants for 
43 felony charges, 64 misdemeanors, and 21 “violations,” including warrants for 
individuals who skipped court dates).
116. See Radley Balko, Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in Amer-
ica (2006).
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violence.117  Police raids in other contexts, such as for drug enforcement, 
are known to be violent and dangerous for all involved.118  These types of 
paramilitary raids “escalate provocation and bring unnecessary violence 
to what would otherwise be a routine, nonviolent police procedure.”119 
The same is to be said of warrant raids: using raids to collect old court 
debt or ensure people’s appearance in court escalates these low-level 
compliance cases into something much more hostile and perilous.
The “demographic and geographic distribution of warrants will 
likely reflect (and reinforce) police enforcement patterns.”120  Because 
low-income, Black, and brown community members are more likely to 
be stopped, searched, and arrested or charged,121 they make up a larger 
percentage of the pool of individuals who owe fines and fees, and there-
fore, who may have court debt outstanding and have a warrant out for 
nonpayment.122  Police are therefore more likely to target those commu-
nities for warrant enforcement in order to collect from those who could 
not afford to pay those monetary sanctions in the first place.
Courts essentially give the police the authority and the tools to 
exercise their discretion to police heavily in certain communities in the 
name of enforcing these noncompliance warrants.  Under current Fourth 
Amendment law, as noted in Subpart III.A, police have wide latitude to 
stop, search, and cite individuals for a large range of low-level but high-
fine offenses.  The cycle then becomes self-perpetuating.  Low-income 
and minority communities are targeted for law enforcement activity; that 
activity results in low-level charges and traffic tickets; individuals cannot 
pay the monetary sanctions associated with such offenses; warrants will 
117. Even former law enforcement officials recognized that this operation had un-
intended harmful consequences.  Stephen Downing, a former deputy chief of 
the Los Angeles Police Department, was quoted as saying that this type of raid 
“feeds the spiral of violence and crime, and it also feeds the breakdown of fam-
ilies.”  Felton, supra note 112.
118. See, e.g., Elisha Anderson, Detroit Settles Case of 7-Year-Old Girl Shot During 
Police Raid for $8.25 Million, Det. Free Press (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.
freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2019/04/04/aiyana-stanley-jones- 
settlement-civil/3365796002 [https://perma.cc/ZK4T-D2EA]; Leif Reigstad, A 
No-Knock Raid in Houston Led to Deaths and Police Injuries.  Should Police Re-
think the Practice?, Tex. Monthly (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.texasmonthly.com/
news/a-no-knock-raid-in-houston-led-to-deaths-and-police- injuries-should-
police-rethink-the-practice [https://perma.cc/YC4E-NFRH]; Steve Vockrodt, 
KCPD Settles Lawsuit over ‘Plainly Incompetent’ Raid on Home with Flash-
Bang Grenade, Kansas City Star (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.kansascity.com/
news/local/crime/article236664783.html [https://perma.cc/2DNF-G8M4].
119. Balko, supra note 116.
120. Sekhon, supra note 93, at 990.
121. See generally Butler, supra note 72 (collecting studies showing disparities in 
stop rates and arrest rates between Black and brown community members and 
white community members, relative to their portion of the total population); 
The Leadership Conference, Restoring a National Consensus: The Need to 
End Racial Profiling in America 9 (2011) (discussing quantitative data re-
garding racial profiling).
122. Sekhon, supra note 93, at 990–92.
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issue in large numbers, often automatically, when those individuals fail 
to pay; and those warrants will result  in an increased overall police pres-
ence and targeted operations to enforce those warrants and collect the 
debt owed, leading to more police interactions.123  Added to this is the fact 
that in many jurisdictions, warrants for failure to pay or appear can come 
with additional fines or fees.124  When individuals are unable to pay the 
fines and fees, the cycle starts all over again.
C. Warrant Enforcement Through Traffic Enforcement
Even if police departments do not engage in the sort of obvious 
proactive warrant enforcement efforts described above, most depart-
ments will still engage in ancillary policing tactics that are intended to 
(and successfully do) execute outstanding warrants.  A prime example of 
this is patrol officers’ use of traffic stops and vehicle checkpoints, which 
are generally justified by vague appeals to “public safety” or “drug en-
forcement.”  Once the individual is stopped or pulled over, the police are 
able to run a search for any outstanding warrants and arrest according-
ly.125  Although the initial police encounter is not, at least on the surface, 
intended to act as a warrant sweep, that is nonetheless the effect—and 
it is why such tactics are frequently used by departments that hope to 
enforce and collect outstanding fines and fees.
Naturally, police will focus these efforts in particular communities. 
Much has been written about the frequency of police targeting Black, 
brown, and poor motorists.126  In Ferguson, officers targeted Black neigh-
borhoods for traffic and citation enforcement, and in the process, were 
able to arrest individuals on outstanding warrants for old municipal and 
traffic citations.127  Even though specific warrant data are unavailable 
in many jurisdictions, it is not a stretch to conclude that Black people 
will be overrepresented in the pool of individuals with outstanding non-
compliance warrants,128 so directing police resources to things like traffic 
123. See Harris et al., supra note 84; see also U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra note 
34.
124. Brett & Nagrecha, supra note 5.
125. See generally Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (checking a driv-
er’s license and determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the 
driver are ordinary inquiries that are a legitimate part of a traffic stop on a traffic 
violation); see also Jeff Welty, May an Officer Run a Motorist’s Criminal Record 
During a Traffic Stop?, North Carolina Criminal Law (Apr. 25, 2017, 8:07 AM), 
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/may-officer-run-motorists-criminal- record-
traffic-stop [https://perma.cc/5KUC-P9YF].
126. See, e.g., Camelia Simoiu et al., Testing for Racial Discrimination in Police 
Searches of Motor Vehicles, SSRN Electronic J. (2016); see also David A. Har-
ris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 
84 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1999); Adero S. Jernigan, Driving While Black: Racial Pro-
filing in America, 24 L. & Psychol. Rev. 127 (2000); Katheryn K. Russell, “Driv-
ing While Black”: Corollary Phenomena and Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. 
Rev. 717 (1999).
127. DOJ Ferguson Report, supra note 1, at 65.
128. Sekhon, supra note 93.
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enforcement and quality-of-life patrol in Black, brown, and poor commu-
nities will return a greater “hit rate” on those warrants.  This risk is not 
hypothetical.  Given how many jurisdictions have a history of overpo-
licing minority communities, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides 
a gaping loophole that allows marginalized community members to be 
subjected to arrests on outstanding warrants that begin originally as ille-
gal stops or seizures.  If the stop does not a return a “hit,” the officer can 
send the person on his way, with little repercussion for the officer.129
The use of vehicle checkpoints to enforce warrants in Black, brown, 
and poor neighborhoods is all of the above, on steroids.  The constitution-
ality of this specific tactic is untested, but checkpoint doctrine is unlikely 
to reign in such practices, at least for now.  Sobriety checkpoints are con-
stitutional.130  So are vehicle checkpoints to assist with border control.131 
And checkpoints carried out in order to request information from mo-
torists about a previously-committed crime are constitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment.132  Although completely suspicion-less checkpoints 
conducted for general crime control purposes are not constitutional,133 it 
is unclear how the Court would treat checkpoints set up in communities 
with a high number of outstanding warrants for unpaid court debt.  Such 
checkpoints would essentially be a warrant enforcement raid as described 
in Subpart III.B, above.  Alternatively, checkpoints could be set up under 
the guise of DUI or other constitutionally permissible enforcement ef-
forts, but used in practice to trap individuals with outstanding warrants.
And suspicion-less checkpoints still occur, despite being constitu-
tionally impermissible.  For example, ongoing litigation against the city of 
Buffalo, NY alleges that the Buffalo Police Department’s “Strike Force 
Unit” set up vehicle checkpoints in predominately poor, Black neighbor-
hoods on Buffalo’s East Side.134  The Strike Force’s aim was to provide 
“high visibility, high saturation” in these neighborhoods.  The checkpoints 
were purportedly to enforce traffic laws and increase public safety, but 
plaintiffs argue that the enforcement tactic was used merely to raise 
revenue through traffic tickets levied against minority motorists.135  As 
a result, the city arrested motorists, impounded their vehicles, and 
129. Individuals subjected to these types of warrant checks have little recourse.  It is 
expensive and timely to sue, and, as discussed above, officers are frequently able 
to justify the stops, even pretextually.  But the stop itself can have a profound im-
pact on the individual stopped; it can be humiliating, degrading, or traumatizing. 
Bandes et al., supra note 27.
130. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
131. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
132. Illinois v. Lidster, 520 U.S. 419 (2004).
133. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
134. Complaint at 10–15, Black Love Resists in the Rust v. City of Buffalo, 
(W.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:18-CV-00719), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/
attach/2018/06/BLRR-v-Buffalo-Complaint-June-28-2018.pdf [https://perma.
cc/2983-9L53].
135. Id.
42 2020:17C J LR
suspended their drivers licenses.136  The case is currently in discovery and 
remains ongoing.
These are just two examples of tactics that police officers have at 
their disposal to obtain and enforce fines and fees.  In the following Part, 
I discuss how these tactics increase the risk of exposure to police violence 
for the Black, brown, and poor communities.
IV. Opportunities for Police Violence
On October 17, 2019, a police sergeant and two officers in the Bronx, 
NY pulled over a driver in an SUV because the driver was not wearing 
a seatbelt.  During the course of the traffic stop, the sergeant discovered 
that the driver had outstanding warrants for failure to pay fines on previ-
ous violations, including a ticket for littering.137  The officers told the man 
they were arresting him for the outstanding fines and ordered him out of 
the car.  The officers claim that, once outside the car, the man “initiated 
a violent struggle” and reentered the car and tried to drive away.  The 
sergeant, who was in the passenger side of the vehicle when this occurred, 
shot and killed the man.  The entire struggle lasted a minute and a half.138 
This was the third time in three days that Bronx police officers had fired 
their guns at a suspect.139
When police are tasked with enforcing fines and fees, and given wide 
discretion to do so, this type of interaction and tragic result is not unsur-
prising.  In general, using police to collect fines and fees is “part of a larger 
trend of thinking about government through the logic of business.”140  Police 
are seen as revenue generators, a piece of the larger bureaucratic machine 
that needs to essentially turn a profit to be viewed as successful.  But as the 
tragic example above shows, there are profound social and human costs to 
deploying the police and other government entities in this way.
 Policing of low-level crimes often becomes inherently violent, both 
physically and structurally.  For example, New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo and New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio have recently pushed 
for greater enforcement of fare evasion in New York City.141  Fare evasion 
136. Id.  The Strike Force’s aim was to provide “high visibility, high saturation” in 
these neighborhoods.
137. Ed Shanahan & Edgar Sandoval, Bronx Shooting: Officer Kills Man in 2nd 
Deadly Police Encounter in Three Days, N.Y. Times (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/10/17/nyregion/police-bronx-shooting.html [https://perma.
cc/6CDL-QZZX].
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Policing and Profit, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1723, 1733 (2015).
141. Azi Paybarah, How Cuomo Plans to Crack Down on Subway Fare Evasion, N.Y. 
Times (June 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/nyregion/newyorkto-
day/nyc-subway-fare-evasion.html [https://perma.cc/J5W6-LER2]; Dana Ruben-
stein, Cuomo and de Blasio Announce Joint Crackdown on Fare Evasion, Separate-
ly, Politico (June 16, 2019, 4:11 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/
albany/story/2019/06/17/cuomo-and-de-blasio-announce-joint-crackdown-on-
fare-evasion- separately-1064222 [https://perma.cc/6E4M-CLYY].
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is a citation-only offense that is often a crime of necessity for those who 
cannot afford to pay for the subway but who rely on public transporta-
tion to get to work, medical appointments, court, or attend to other daily 
needs.142  Over the summer of 2019, Governor Cuomo announced the 
deployment of 500 additional uniformed officers to combat fare evasion 
in subway and bus stations, in the hopes of deterring people from trying 
to board transit without paying, which was costing the city and state mon-
ey.143  In announcing these plans, public officials were adamant that the 
additional police was just for deterrent effect and people would only be 
issued tickets for failing to pay their fare.144  Yet that fall, images and vid-
eos circulated of NYPD officers violently arresting people—all Black or 
brown—in subway cars and stations for fare evasion.145  In one incident, 
officers deployed their Taser and arrested two teenagers for fare eva-
sion.146  In another, caught on video, officers on a subway platform drew 
and pointed their guns at a young Black man who sat in a parked sub-
way car with his arms raised; as the doors opened, eight officers stormed 
the car and tackled the man, violently arresting him.147  Officers claimed 
they were following up on a tip that the man had a gun, but no gun was 
found—in the end, they charged the man with criminal fare evasion. 
The damage of the incident extended beyond that one man’s arrest: one 
woman posted on Twitter that her young sons were riding in the car, and 
came home “inconsolable” after seeing the arrest, having been exposed 
to the brutality of the police and the trauma it inflicts.148
142. See Nick Martin, The Class War of Fare-Dodging Crackdowns, New Republic 
(Oct. 31, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/155540/class-war-fare-dodging-
crackdowns [https://perma.cc/ARH4-BKN2]; Mitali Nagrecha, Flush with Rev-
enue, MTA Must Stop Punishing Farebeaters, Crain’s N.Y. Bus. (Apr. 24, 2019, 
12:00 AM), https://www.crainsnewyork.com/op-ed/flush- revenue-mta-must-
stop-punishing-farebeaters [https://perma.cc/N37M-UJMH].
143. Paybarah, supra note 141.  Notably, according to the Wall Street Journal, fare 
evasion has actually increased since the deployment of these additional offi-
cers.  Paul Berger & Leslie Brody, Police Haven’t Slowed New Yorkers’ Subway 
Fare Evasion, Wall St. J. (Oct. 21, 2019, 6:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
police-havent-slowed-new-yorkers-subway-fare-evasion-11571697440 [https://
perma.cc/9N4E-LXRH]; Terry Nguyen, Fare evasion costs cities millions.  But 
will cracking down on it solve anything?, Vox (Nov. 15, 2019, 12:58 PM), https://
www.vox.com/the-goods/2019/11/12/20959914/fare-evasion-costs-cities-millions.
144. See Rubenstein, supra note 141.  Notably, reports have shown that NYPD’s fare 
evasion enforcement has been targeted in stations that are near poor, Black 
neighborhoods.  Harold Stolper & Jeff Jones, The Crime of Being Short 
$2.75: Policing Communities of Color at the Turnstile (2017), https://sm-
http-ssl-58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/Fare_Evasion_ 
FINAL_10_6_17_smaller.pdf [httsp://perma.cc/89RZ-TVFG].
145. E.g., Katie Shepherd, ‘Putting Dozens of Lives at Risk over $2.75’: NYPD Slammed 
for Pulling Guns on Fare-Hopping Teen, Wash. Post (Oct. 28, 2019, 4:09 AM), 
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These fare evasion arrests in NYC are just one way in which en-
forcement encounters are often in and of themselves violent acts.  But 
more broadly, even when enforcement encounters do not start off that 
way, the historical oppression of Black, brown, and poor communities by 
the police means that such interactions can turn violent rather quickly.149 
Many police killings begin as ordinary police interactions that escalate 
into deadly encounters.  Research shows that unarmed Black men are 
shot and killed at disproportionately high rates,150 and officers may be 
biased in how they perceive threats from Black versus white individu-
als.151  And we know that law enforcement feels like an “occupying force” 
in many low-income, minority communities.152  As discussed in Part II, 
living under perpetual surveillance for new tickets or infractions, and the 
constant threat of punishment for outstanding fines and fees, is violence 
in and of itself.  Moreover, the unrelenting presence of police in these 
communities allows for frequent, often hostile, interactions that turn 
physically violent as well.  Police-related death rates are highest in neigh-
borhoods with the greatest concentrations of low-income residents.153 
Perhaps some of this can be explained by the correlation between crime 
rates and poverty in many neighborhoods, but the more likely explana-
tion is that police tend to use their discretion to police more and more 
harshly in these communities.
The killing of Walter Scott in North Charleston, SC is a clear ex-
ample.  A North Charleston police officer shot and killed Mr. Scott in 
an encounter that stemmed from a traffic stop for a minor vehicle in-
fraction.  During the course of the stop, the officer ordered Mr. Scott out 
of his car.  Mr. Scott ran from the officer, and the officer shot him in the 
back.  Mr. Scott’s family speculated that he ran from the officer because 
he was afraid of being arrested on a warrant for outstanding child sup-
port.154  He was not running from the police because he was dangerous, 
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or attempting to commit additional crimes—he was running out of fear 
of the consequences that stemmed from his failure to pay.  Specifically 
targeting motorists in minority communities for the purposes of warrant 
enforcement will create many more similarly tragic opportunities for po-
lice violence.
Police violence is also particularly acute for Black women155 as well 
as transgender people of color.156  Studies suggest that these groups en-
dure violence from the hands of police not only through routine police 
encounters, but also through coercive sexual harassment, extortion, and 
forcible sexual violence.157  When fines and fees enforcement increases 
police interactions with these vulnerable groups, so too does increase the 
opportunity for police to perpetuate such violence.158
Police violence in both physical and nonphysical forms also has 
profound effects on the safety and security of entire communities.  The 
occupying force of police in some neighborhoods affects political behav-
ior and perceptions of police legitimacy, which may allow police violence 
to continue.  Street-level police generate “political experiences of gov-
ernment,” and police officers are “one of the most visible and proximate 
instantiations of state power in many citizens’ lives.”159  For this reason, 
people look to their direct experiences with the police . . . as they [seek] 
to ground their explanations of how government works, what political 
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life is like for them, and how they understand their own political identi-
ties.”160  Moreover, as noted by Vesla Weaver, Gwen Prose, and Spencer 
Piston, “[i]nvoluntary police interventions incentivize broader, strate-
gic retreat from engagement with the state.”161  Their groundbreaking 
work,162 which created “portals” for community members to come to-
gether and discuss their interactions with police, found that overpolicing 
creates an “ethics of aversion” that promotes nonengagement with civil 
life, and instead, pushes people in “race-class subjugated communities” 
to develop deep interpersonal and community connections that are ex-
clusive of the police.163
Relatedly, repeated punitive enforcement of fines and fees con-
tributes to “legal estrangement,” a concept coined by Monica Bell that 
suggests the problem of policing is that “at both an interactional and 
structural level, current regimes can operate to effectively banish whole 
communities from the body politic.”164  Overpolicing of minor offenses 
and the use of punitive enforcement mechanisms to collect fines and fees 
can result in entire communities feeling ostracized and entirely outside 
of the protection and benefits of the law.165  This is what the residents of 
Ferguson expressed to the Department of Justice—that the focus on rev-
enue collection and low-level crimes was “designed to bring a black man 
down”166 and that the police were not there to help them with their prob-
lems.167  These offenses are often so minor, superfluous, and attenuated 
from any legitimate public safety rationale that those subjected to their 
enforcement feel nothing short of exploited.  Because “legal estrange-
ment is born of the cumulative, collective experience of procedural and 
substantive injustice,”168 negative police-community relationships exacer-
bated by prolonged overenforcement of fines and fees can have powerful 
and enduring effects, causing individuals to retreat from public discourse 
and participation.169  This feeling of otherness, and the resulting separa-
tion, is its own form of violence and oppression.
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Estrangement can also be direct and intentional.  In many juris-
dictions, continued punitive enforcement of fines and fees by police 
results in voter disenfranchisement—another abstract form of violence 
against low-income and minority communities.170  Fines and fees create 
an “economic caste system” where the poor are excluded from democrat-
ic participation and subject to a “new peonage” based on their inability 
to pay.171  This was on display recently in Florida, where voters passed 
a referendum restoring voting rights to individuals who had previously 
been convicted of felonies, but state legislators later made that resto-
ration contingent on full repayment of all fines and fees.172  Democratic 
estrangement, a form of legal estrangement, denies these individuals a 
voice in reform of the government structures and systems they must 
endure, thereby preventing them from being able to address or prevent 
future continued police oppression and violence.
Conclusion
Reducing exposure to police violence requires reforms to the role 
that police currently play in systems of monetary sanctions.  Leaders in 
the fight to end police brutality are organizing, rallying, and demanding 
reduction in the overall size and scope of police in American society173—
and rightly so.  Fines and fees reformers should contribute to this effort 
by actively pushing for a dismantling of the role that law enforcement 
currently plays in imposing and collecting fines and fees.
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Some police leaders are beginning to recognize the problems of 
engaging in revenue-driven policing.  Officials in Dallas, TX directed po-
licing resources away from petty offense enforcement for the purposes 
of fine collection, and over a period of four years, decreased the number 
of traffic tickets issued by more than half.174  Dallas’ Police Chief ex-
plicitly rejected the fines and fees enforcement push that was pervasive 
throughout the state, saying on the record that “[w]e [the Dallas Police 
Department] don’t believe the citizens of Dallas want its police depart-
ment writing citations to raise revenues.”175
But this is not enough.  Truly reforming fines and fees and reducing 
the potential for deadly police interactions will also require addressing 
policing tactics, motivations, and discretion head on.  Even where cities 
eliminate the direct link between policing and revenue generation, or 
publicly renounce using citations to raise revenue, additional reforms will 
still be necessary to minimize the use of police as debt collectors and the 
resultant opportunities for police violence.
This Article does the work of identifying the touchpoints of the 
problem.  A full evaluation of policy solutions to reduce these touchpoints 
is the subject of another article.  At a minimum, however, jurisdictions 
clearly must both eliminate the use of warrants to collect unpaid court 
debt, and reduce the occupying presence that law enforcement serves 
in communities of color by restricting policing strategies like stop and 
frisk, broken windows policing, and pretextual vehicle searches or vehicle 
checkpoints to search for outstanding warrants.  Such reforms, coupled 
with a more widescale effort to decriminalize minor offenses or eliminate 
unduly harsh municipal code offenses from the books, could go a long 
way to reduce the opportunity for police violence against poor, Black, and 
brown community members in the name of fines and fees enforcement.
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